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THE LAW AS TO CONSENT WHEN PLEADED AS
A DEFENCE TO CERTAIN CRIMES
AGAINST THE PERSON.
In the succeeding pages an attempt will be made to state
concisely the law as to certain phases of the doctrine of
consent, and while so doing, to ascertain how far it is consistent with sound logic and common sense.
At the beginning of any discussion it is well briefly, yet
accurately, to define its limits.
In the present instance it is not my purpose to deal with
the whole question of consent as a defence to a charge of
crime, but merely to examine its general character and the
questions presented when .it is pleaded as a defence to indictments for rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and
assault.
With regard to the three crimes above mentioned, it
should be said that consent when pleaded as a defence presents a number of interesting and-closely allied questions
of the same general character.
Before going further let us examine the law as to consent when pleaded generally as a defence to alleged crime.
A satisfactory statement of the general rule is, that "No
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act shall be deemed a crime if done with the consent of the
party injured," etc., with certain qualifications not affecting
this discussion. '.

-

Consent then, 'when proved, -being, in most- cases, an adequate defence to a .criminal indictment, let. us examine it
in detail; in connection with its efficacy as a defence to the
three specific crimes selected for e-aminati6n, to-Wit 'rape,
assault with intent, etc., and assault.
We shall first deal w ith rape, because the largest number of cases, and hence the greatest amotunt of discussion
has arisen with regard to that, crime. ,
CONSENT

I.

WHEN

'A DEFENCE

PLEADED 'AS

CHARGE OF RAPE.

TO

THE

- -

In considering this part- of our subject, it is of primary
importance to determine (i) the origin and development
of the definition of rape at common law; (2) the nature
England to-day; (3) its nature in the
of the crinie ifiUnited 'States; (4): to what extent it--has been affected in
America by the' tahdency;, observable in many states, to
codify the law.
I . As early as th&"thirteenth centulry we-find :Bracton
writing thfis: "There is amongst other appeals'a certain
appeal which is called concerning the rape' 6f virgins, and
the rape of a virgin is'a certain crime,""which a -Woman
against a man, by whom 'she says that she has been
violently overpowered against'the' eace of tle -iolrthe
king," etc. 2 And later in speaking of the r'isoner's de'fence: "Likewise he may except against hei', -that he had
her and deflowered her with her will, and not against her
will, and that she has' lately appealed '-him in hatred of
another woman, whom he keeps as a :concubine, or whom
he has taken to be his wife, and through the instikifi6on of

-charges

some of her relatives." 3

'

.
'

The firsf sfatute on the subject-seems to bethe Statute
of Westminster the First, 3 Edward I.; 1275; the terms of
-

AAm. and-Engl. Enl.of Law, Vol. 3(ilst ed.), page 662.
.
(Citing authorities.)
147a .
C p.
Lib. IIe,
,Bracton
*Biacton, Lib.'Ifl, D 'Corona, Cap. '28, f.'I48 4 .
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which were as follows: "And the King prohibeth that
none do ravish, nor take away -by force any maiden within
Age (neither by her own consent nor without), nor any
Wife or Maiden of full Age,4 nor any other Woman against
her will; and if any do," etc.
Ten years later, in 1285, we find the subject again dealt
with in the Second Statute of Westminster, thus: "It is
provided, That if a Man from henceforth do ravish a
Woman married, Maid or other, where she did not consent neither before nor after he shall have Judgement of
Life and of Member. And likewise where a Man ravisheth a Woman married, Lady, Damozel, or other, with
Force, although she consent after, he shall have such Judgement as before is said, if he be attainted at the King's suit,
and there the King shall have the suit."5
The difference in the wording of these two statutes was
responsible for much of the difficulty in which the subject
became involved in later years. This difference lies in the
fact that in the St. 3 Ed. I., the phrase used is, "nor any
Wife or Maiden of full Age, nor any other Woman against
her will," while in the Second Statute of Westminster the
apposite wording is, "where she did not consent neither
before nor after," etc.
The question as to whether with respect to these phrases
a real difference in meaning exists between the two statutes was fruitful of much controversy, and a little later
we shall deal more particularly therewith.
To return to the definition: In Coke's Institutes this
subject is thrice mentioned. In I. Inst., Sect. 19o, 6 it is
said: "Rape, Raptus, is, when a man hath carnall knowledge of a woman by force and against her -will." Again
in the second part of the Institutes, Cap. XIII., in
commenting upon the Statute of Westminster First,"
Coke affirms the above definition, and recites at length the
different punishments meted out at various times for this
crime, it having been made a felony by the Statute of West43

Ed. i, West. I., Cap. XIII.
Lit. I Inst., Sec. 19o.

6Co.
7

5 13 Ed. x, West. II., Cap. XXXIV.

Co. Lit. II. Inst. (Westm. primer, Cap. XIII), page*I79.

s Supra, note 3.
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minster II., dire results having -ensued from weakening
the punitive law with respect to it ten -years previously.
Finally, in.3d Inst., Cap. XI, p. 6o,9 a more lengthy definition is given: "Rape is felony by the common law, declared by parliament, for the. unlawfull and carnall knowledge and abuse of any woman above the age of ten years
against her will,, or of a woman.child under the age of ten
years with -her will,.-or against her will, and the offender
-shall not have the benefit of clergy."
Hale' ° quotes the foregoing definition, with the omission
of a few unimportant words, and Hawkins in his work on
Crown Law" briefly: describes the crime as follows: "It
seems that -rape is an offence in having unlawful and carnal
knowledge of a woman by force and against her will."
Coming to more modem times, -we find a similar definition
in East's Crown Law,'12 where-it is said, that "Rapeis the
unlawful carnal knowledge. of. a woman by force and
against her will."
The foregoing definitions have bebn recited at length to
show that the 1eading English ju-ists, lawyers, and commentators, followed, in their- definitions of -the offence, the
wording of the First Statute of Westminster, instead, of
that of the Second. It may easily be seen that such a
course would be likely to cause trouble, and such was the
case. In 1859, in a case8 ,tried before Lord Campbell, C.
J., it appeared that a feeble-minded girl had been violated.
In deciding the case his Lordship said: "I am of opinion
that the conviction must be affirmed.-

.

.

.

The defini-

tion of rape may now be considered .res adjudicata. The
question is, what is the proper definition of the crime of
rape? - Is it carnal knowledge of a woman, against her will,
or is it sufficient if it be without the consent of the prosecutrix? If it must be against her will, then the crime was
not proyed in this case," etc. He then goes on to say that
Co. Lit., 3 d Inst.; Cap. XI, p. 6o.
10Hale, P. C., *628. (Hale's Pleas of the Crown was not published

before his death in ±676. Parliament requested its publicationin x.68o,
but an authoritative edition did not appear until 1736.)
11Hawkins, P. C., Chap: XVI, p. 121, 716. "
12 1 East., P. C., 434, Sec. i, i8o6
IsR. v. Fletcher, 8 Cox C. C. I3I. (Ct. of Crim. App., 1859.)
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under the statute of Westm. II., the vital question is
whether the woman "consents either before or after," and
such being the case, and it being clear that here the girl
from lack of mental capacity never was able to consent,
the prisoner was properly convicted. His Lordship also
cited the case of R. v. Camplin'4 as a leading decision in
support of his opinion, arguing that by holding in that case
that a connection with a non-resisting drunken woman
amounted to rape, the court had tacitly affirmed the definition of the crime contained in 13 Ed. I., Cap. XXXIV.
In the same case Martin, B., said: "I am of the same
opinion. I am quite content to take the Stat. West. II, C.
34, and follow the definition in it, and apply it to the facts."
This exposition of the law was affirmed eighteen years
later in the case of Regina v. Flattery,15 Huddleston, B.,
saying: "The definition of rape as given in the statute of
13 Edw. I., C. 34, was adopted by this court in Reg. v.
Fletcher. Generally speaking it is ravishing where the
female does not consent before or after."
2. Therefore we may conclude that in England at the
present time it is judicially held that while some difference may exist between the two statutes with regard to the
synonymity of the phrases "against her will" and "without
her consent," and though the statute Westm. I. may have
been followed by many eminent text writers in their definitions of the crime, still the courts in their decisions, notably
in R. v. Camplin,'6 have definitely adopted the statute
of Westm. II. as controlling law. Consequently it follows that in England to-day rape is, legally speaking, the
unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman had forcibly and
without her consent.
3. Let us now consider the status of the definition at the
present time in the United States.
It may be said with regard to the definition, that the
various states having modeled their statutes on the English
law, there is but little variance in wording from that employed in one or the other of the English acts. Hence in
14 1 Cox C. C. 220, 1845.
15 X3

Cox C. C. 388.

1
0 Supra,note 14.

(Ct. of CQim. App., 1877.)
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America, -as in England, the main point of difficulty in the
language of the definition is the same, namely, which phrase
shall be used to express non-consent and whether the two.
phrases are alike in meaning.
The other principal difficulties of the definition, to-wit:
the correct legal interpretation of its potential words, will
be dealt with at length under a subsequent head.
The present question is reviewed in a masterly manner
by the late Mr. Justice Gray. The point as to the synonymity of the phrases "against her will" and "without her
17
consent" came before him in Commonwealth v. Burke,
which was the case of a woman violated during drunken
torpor. The prisoner sought to take advantage of the fact
that the words of the Massachusetts statute governing the
offence charged were "against her will," claiming, of
course, that the intoxicated woman had no will.
Judge Gray pointed out that in a formerly operative
clause of the statute dealing With a somewhat different
offence the term "without consent" had been employed,
and expressed the opinion that the two terms were identical in meaning.
He carefully considered the English authorities upon
the subject, and said in the course of his opinion: "The
crime consists in the enforcement of a woman without her
consent. The simple question, -expressed in the briefest
form, is: Was the woman willing or unwilling? The
earlier and more weighty authorities show that the words
'against her will,' in the standard definitions, mean exactly
the same thing as 'without her consent'; and that the distinction between these phrases, as applied to this crime,
which has been suggested in some modern books is unfounded."
Further on he speaks of the leading English decision as
follows: "Although in Regina v. Fletcher, ubi supra,
Lord Campbell, C. J. (ignoring the old authorities and the
repealing St. of 9 Geo. IV.),, unnecessarily and erroneously
assumed that the St. of Westm. II. was still in force; that
it defined the crime of rape; and that there was a difference
between the expressions 'against her *¢ill' and 'without
17 ioS Mass. 376, 1870.
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her consent' in the definitions of this crime; none of the
other cases in England have been put upon that ground,
and their judicial value is not impaired by his inaccuracies." ' In conclusion the learned judge decided that connection under the circumstances then before him was clearly
rape, saying, "If it were otherwise, any woman in a state
of utter stupefaction, whether caused by drunkenness, sudden disease, the blow of a third person, or drugs which she
had been persuaded to take, even by the defendant himself,
would be unprotected from personal dishonor. The law
is not open to such a reproach."
In marked contrast with the opinion expressed in the
foregoing case are the views pronounced by Judge Cooley
in the early Michigan decision of Cornwell v. The People.19
The facts were peculiar. It was proved that the prisoner
had had connection with, an insane woman, of whose insanity he was not aware, and not only was there no evidence that she resisted the act, but it appeared to have been
performed with her entire concurrence and probably at
her solicitation.
Could such a connection amount to rape?
Judge Cooley first referred to the Michigan statute governing the crime, 20 and pointed out the fact that the phrase
employed was "'by force and against her will." He then
asked the plain question as to whether this phrase could be
considered equivalent to "without consent," and answered
it thus: "The word 'will,' as employed in defining the crime
of rape, is not construed as implying the faculty of mind
by which an intelligent choice is made between objects; but
rather as synonymous with inclination or desire; and in that
sense it is used with propriety with reference to persons of
unsound mind. We are aware of no adjudged case that will
justify us in construing the words 'against her will' as equivalent in meaning with 'without her intelligent assent'; nor do
we think sound reason will sanction it." He next proceeds
to solve the case along the following line: the woman
18It should be remembered that this utterance of Gray, J., was made
seven years before the decision in R. v. Flattery (supra).
13 Michigan, 427, 1865.
20 See. 5730 of Compiled Laws (Michigan).
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though insane had a will, wild, ungovernable and perverted
though it was. The prisoner's act was not only not contrary
to such will but in accordance with it; therefore, the prisoner's act was innocent, since by the statute such an act
must be "by force and against her will." The judge said,
however, that in order to avoid the hardship incident to this
theory, it should be held that in cases "where the woman
trom absence of mental action does not willingly acquiesce,
that the physical force necessary to effectuate the purpose,
howev'er slight, is against her will."
It seems that Judge Cooley in this case was confused by
the fact. that the word "consent" has not always connoted
"intelligence" when judicially defined. His idea of consent, right enough to our thinking, is an intelligent consent, and he argues that because "will" has not always been
construed as an intelligent "will," it cannot be considered
equivalent to "consent." This, however, does not follow,
since we shall see later that both "consent" and "will" have
been frequently defined in this connection so as to exclude
intelligence as a necessary element. It is submitted that
both "consent" and "will" should be so construed as to
imply intelligence; yet such has not been the general rule
with regard to either, and a difference cannot be found in
the fact that the quality of intelligence has been judicially
attributed to "consent" but not to "will." While Judge
Cooley's doctrine may, if the judges be watchful, prove
protective to total idiots or those whose bodies yield to the
act as unresponsively as paper to pen, yet it is submitted
that were it followed, a large class of the most unfortunate
women alive, those whose natural passions have been unduly excited by some derangement of the mind, and who
morbidly seek physical pleasure, the significance of which
they do not know, and those imbeciles also whose minds
are not so utterly blank but that the act of coition stirs
within them responsive bodily desire; these wretched
women are left defenceless under such a theory, the prey
of any beast who may chance across their ways. How can
it be asserted that the "will" intended by the statute was
a "perverted will"? To hold so is to revert to mediaevalism, and to place insanity among the punishments of
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Heaven, to be carried into effect on earth. On this point,
though I yield to none in respect for Judge Cooley's
brilliant attainments, it seems to me that .he is both illogical
and unjust, for he first declares "against her will" and
"without her consent" as of different meaning without giving satisfactory reasons therefor, and then he defines "will"
so broadly that any wild impulse of a disordered mind may
be considered as the "will" of its unfortunate possessor,
though the consequence of such construction be that the
protection of the law is withdrawn fr.om her already mentally defenceless body, and she is thus left open to unpunishable pollution.
The last American case on this part of our subject which
we shall consider is The State v. Tarr,2 1 decided by the
Supreme Court of Iowa in 1869. The Iowa statute was
similar to that in Michigan, the words employed being the
same.22 The facts showed connection had with an imbecile
girl who made little oi" no resistance. The court, after
specifically approving the decision in Cornwell v. The
People2 3 says that the facts in this case take it out
of that class in which the woman though of unbalanced
mind participates in the act, and that here there was really
only that non-resistance due to imbecility. The peculiar
doctrine of "animal desire," however, is approved of, and
then the following method of reasoning is used-to avoid the
consequences of the theory espoused. Let us, hold, says the
court, in effect, that where the state proves imbecility of the
prosecutrix and force on the part of the prisoner, that then
if there is nothing to indicate her consent, it (the act) must
have been, in legal contemplation, against her will. What
is such a mode of reasoning but a legal quibble, what is
the difference between holding the phrases synonymous and
holding that failure to prove the negative of one supports
the other affirmatively? The court, however, seems to
adopt the view that the phrases are theoretically different.
Cole, C. J., dissented flatly in this case, and in an opinion
which, if faulty in logic, is at least clear and straightforward in statement, asserted that the phrases under discus21

23

28 Iowa, 397, 1869.
Supra, note 19.

22

Rev. Par: 4204, Iowa Statutes.
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sion differed essentially in meaning, saying, "There is, it
seems to me, a manifest difference between non-consent and
against the will. There are very many things done without my consent, which are not, nevertheless against my
will. A female may passively submit to intercourse with a
man, and it may truthfully be said that she did not consent,
although it was not against her will."
4. Having now reviewed the leading cases in the United
States upon this point, let us see to what result they
tend. Before attempting to state the law, it should be note¢d
that in this country the subject is rendered more complex
by the fact that in nearly every state an attempt has been
24
made to settle it by statute.
It is believed that a general examination of our statute
law will show that the phrase employed to express nonconsent is usually "against her will."
As a matter of course the decisions of the various courts
have been influenced in great measure by the language of
the controlling statutes, and it is thought that many of the
decisions of our state .courts, the practical result of which
was an admission of legal inability to punish grievous
moral wrong, had their, origin in the fact that overhasty
legislators had, in attempting to copy the letter of the English law, neglected to acquaint themselves with its spirit,
and by a strange fatuity ignorantly embodied in a mailed
code that expression of non-consent which is capable of a
narrow interpretation and which in England has been judicially declared superseded by the -comprehensive phrase,
"without her consent."
No general definition of rape can be given as obtaining
at this time in the United States. As we have seen, however, there are two lines of reasoning, by following which
various courts have arrived at different conclusions.
In Massachusetts and states agreeing with her, "rape" is
held to be the having of unlawful carnal knowledge of
a woman forcibly and against her 'willor without her consent, the phrases being considered as equivalent in meaning
21See: 5 o Barb. (N. Y.) 128; 2 Swan (Tenn.), 394; 6 Baxter
(Tenn.), 614; 28 Iowa, 397; 4 So. Rep. 775; 13 Mich. 427; 25 Mich.
355; 15 Texas App. 27 5; 94 Ind. 96.
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since earliest times. In those jurisdictions, however, where
judge Cooley's' opinion in Cornwell v. The People2 5 is
followed, the phrases are held essentially different, and a
narrower meaning'accorded to "against her will." In such
states, an effort is generally made, by special presumption
as to the degree of force necessary to constitute the crime,
to evade the hardship flowing from such a view.
In other states, such as Iowa,2 6 the phrases, while considered theoretically different, are construed as practically the
same.
In examining a case in this country, therefore, we must
primarily ascertain how the crime is defined in the jurisdiction where it arises, and especially which phrase is employed in the governing statute and how it is construed.
It is -true, however, that in both England and America
the following definition, either in whole or in part, is universally accepted. Rape is the unlawful carnal knowledge
which a man has of a woman forcibly and against her will
or without her consent.
This definition when analyzed with reference to the purpose of this article presents three important questions,
to-wit: (i) The difference, if any, between "against her
will" and "without her consent," which we have discussed
while tracing the origin and development of the definition;
(2) the legal meaning of the word "forcibly"; (3) and,
lastly, the legal meaning of the word "consent."
Let us now attempt to answer the two questions last
stated.
2. And first let us ascertain in this conhection the construction of the word "forcibly"; (a) in Great Britain and
(b) in the United States.
a. During the Middle Ages, when the definition of "rape"
was first placed upon the statute books, there was little
or no question as to the construction of the term "forcibly."
In those days, because of the lax enforcement of the laws
incident to feudalism, this crime was nearly always attended
by excessive "force." However, as years went on and the
arm of the law grew stronger, it became increasingly difficult to deflower a woman in the open highway, and the
25Supra, note i9.

11

See State v. Tarr (supra).
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raptor accordingly changed his tactics and endeavored to
gratify his lust, not as formerly by superior strength, but
by means of fraud and stratagem and upon the defenceless
bodies of the drugged, the intoxicated and the insane.
- As a result of changed conditions, therefore, several
new classes of cases presented themselves, and the courts
were confronted with the problem of affording the remedy
justly demanded by novel states of facts through the means
of a criterion of criminality formulated in a past age when
such states of facts never existed, and hence were not considered in its formulation.
That the courts were conspicuously successful in settling
this difficulty cannot be claimed, but that they earnestly
tried to do so is not denied.
An important class of cases in which the degree of
"force" necessary for the completion of the crime presents
itself as a delicate and vital question, is that class wherein
connection is had with a married woman by the fraudulent
impersonation of her husband. As we shall discuss these
cases fully under another head, we shall merely dwell on
that portion of them now which relates to the degree of
"force" required to constitute the crime. In Regina v.
Jackson,27 an early and leading case, nothing was said
directly on this point; the decision in fact was written by
the reporters and is very vague; the result, i. e., that the
act was not a rape, being stated without the reasons therefor. In another case 28 sixteen years later Baron Gurney,
while directing the jury to acquit the prisoner of the capital
charge, instructed them that under a recent statute2 9 they
might find him guilty of an assault if the evidence warranted it. It is submitted that there could be no conviction
of assault without the presence of unlawful force, and in
the case in question the only force proved was that necessary to effect copulation. In a decision following closely
after the foregoing case80 the capital charge was held negatived by the evidence, and the trial continued as for an
assault. The report says:
7 R.andR. 4 86, 1822.
affirming R. v. _7ackson.
29 1 Vict., C. 85, S. I1.

SeealsoR. v. Clarke, 6 CoxC. C. 412, 1854,
21R. v. Saunders, 8 C. and P. 265, 1838.
10R. v. Williams, 8 C. and P. 286, 1838.
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"Price addressed the jury for the prisoner, and was stating that to constitute an assault there must be resistance in
the party assaulted.
S"Aldersoi, B. 'In an assault of this nature there need not
be resistance-the fraud is enough. If resistance is prevented by the fraud of the man who pretends to be the
husband, that is sufficient.'" Nothing is said with regard
to the degree of. force required to establish the capital
charge.
The facts in Regina v. Stanton3' were slightly different,
but of the same nature as those in the foregoing cases.
There Emma Brown had her physician indicted for an
assault with intent to commit rape, with a count for a
common assault, alleging that he had penetrated her person
while pretending to administer an injection. In charging
the jury Coleridge, J., said: "If there was force the full
crime was complete. An assault with intent to commit a
rape is very different from an assault with intent to have
an improper connection. The former is with intent to have
a connection by force; but here, according to the statement
of the prosecutrix, the defendant desists the moment she
resists, and at the most it could only be an attempt by surprise to get possession of the person of the prosecutrix,
and that is not an assault with intent to commit a rape,
but is an assault." In other words, the court says that while
the evidence in this case, that the prisoner did not mean to
perpetrate the crime if his fraud were discovered, might
negative his guilt under the indictment for an attempt to
commit, yet since the force employed was unlawful, he
could be convicted of a common assault.
The three cases just discussed were all decided at nisi
prius. The case of R. v. Sweenie was decided in 1854 by the
High Court of Justiciary of. Scotland, and, therefore, deserves greater consideration. 32 It appeared here that awoman
had been violated while asleep by the prisoner, who fraudulently impersonated her husband. Lord Cowan, speaking
for the majority of the court, disposed of several minor
objections as immaterial, saying: "For still the act must
have been perpetrated forcibly; and where is force charged
3 1

: C. and

K. 416,

1844.

32

8

Cox C. C.

223,1858.
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in this indictment? Nowhere, as an actual fact substantially alleged. Constructively it is said that in the absence
of consent, which is assumed from the woman being asleep,
there must have been force used in the act of connection.
But this I apprehend cannot be viewed as the force which
the law has declared necessary for the commission of this
crime. That force is not the mere physical force required
for the completion of the act of connection. What is requisite is the forcibly taking possession of the woman's person
and having connection with her, her will resisting, or if not
resisting, her will having been overcome by felonious acts
of the assailer." His Lordship then goes on to state that
he intends his last phrase to cover cases of stupefaction and
unconsciousness produced by the prisoner; that the cases
of children and insane women are not analogous, and that
as to the case of a woman in syncope or in a state of intoxication, he would not deal with that until it arose, as it did
not affect the point at issue.
On the other hand Lord President MacNeill in delivering the minority opinion adduced the following view:
"Then as to the element of physical force or violence, that
also must be subject to limitation and construction. The
power of resistance must be removed without the application of any physical force, or it may be overcome by very
little force. What degree of force or violence will be held
to constitute rape must depend on circumstances. The degree of violence used may be expected to vary with the
power of resistance. The law does not desiderate more
force than is necessary to overcome the power of resistance,
which may be greater or less according to the condition of
the sufferer, who may be a robust, active woman, cool and
self-possessed, or may be a poor cripple. I hold, therefore,
that in considering what are the essentials of the crime of
rape, the descriptive terms 'forcibly and against her will,'
are to be construed with reference to the circumstances of
the case, the physical and mental condition of the party
injured."
The portions of the opinions just quoted show very well
the conservative and the liberal treatment of the question.
The majority adhered to the old idea that excessive "force"
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was a necessary element of rape, while the minority recognized-the fact that it is the first duty of a cofift of law to
dispense justice, and -finding that a strict construction ,of
the word'defeated their purpose, they' constirued it more
liberally, in order to meet conditions comparatively novel
in the law.
And as lately as 1884, in R. v. Dee,83 Chief Justice May,
of Ireland, in the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, said: "It
is plain, however, 'forcibly' does' not mean violently, but
with that description of force which, must be exercised in
order to -accomplish the act, for there is no doubt that
unlawful connection with a woman in a state of uncon-sciousness, produced by profound sleep, stupor, or otherwise, if the man knows that the woman is in such a state,
amounts to a rape."
Another kind of case in which the same question arises
is where the facts show connection had with a non-resisting
imbecile. Is such a connection "forcible"? In R. v.
Fletcher,34 Lord Campbell, C. J., held in terms that it
is, and his decision was subsequently affirmed in R. v.
Barrat"5 and in the analogous and leading case of R. v.
Camplin,3 6 where the facts showed that the prisoner had
given the prosecutrix liquor for the purpose of exciting
her, and then upon her becoming insensible, had violated
her person, the point as to the degree of "force" necessary
was raised and debated at length. In deciding the case
Lord Denman, C. J., said, addressing the prisoner: "Your
case, therefore, falls within the description of those cases
in which force and violence constitute the crime, but in
which fraud is held to supply the want of both."
In England, then, the law seems to be that in cases of
fraudulent connection with a sane and conscious woman
there is sufficient unlawful "force" in the act itself to
amount to a common assault. It is not definitely held that
the "force" employed is insufficient to maintain the capital
charge; which, together with the charge of assault with intent, etc., is dismissed, on the ground that "consent" existed.
The theory on which many of the cases go certainly is that
331 Cox C. C. 579, x884.
"51' Cox C. C. 498, 1873.

34 Supra, note 13.
31Sipra,note i4.
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fraud supplies the vant of force. In cases where imbecility
or stupefaction exists, we have just seen that fraud being
proved, no proof of additional force is -required to sustain
an indictmen't for rape.
In Scotland since R. v. Sweenie the term "forcibly" is
strictly interpreted, and unless a woman has been rendered
insensible by the prisoner, she is, unless specially protected
by statute, open to violation by fraud or by anyone who
may desire to possess her while unconscious and helpless.
In Ireland the decision in R. v. Dee sheds a ray of sunlight across this cobwebbed comer of the-storehouse of the
Iaw, and taken in connection with the -dissenting opinion in
R. v. Sweenie, gives promise of better things to come. In
Ireland since the foregoing case only so much "'force" ,is
required to support the charge .of "rape", as the circumstances show'to have been necessary to overcome the will
of the prosecutrix, 'and if it appears that through the existence of fraud, imbecility, or stupefaction, no miore force
wa-ihiecessary than that'needed to perform' the act, then
such "force" is held unlawful. and sufficient to
the
capital charg'e.f It is submitted that where there is no intelligent consent to the act, even the slightest, touching of the
parts iii its performance is an application of unlawful force,
and that the Irish rule is just, adequate and humane.
"
(b) Let us now see what the law upon .this point, is in
the Lnited States.
In Bailey v. Com.37 the facts were that a stepfather
stealthily gained his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter's room
in the night when no help was near, and entering her bed,
despite her frightened entreaties and protests, had his will,
she not crying out nor physically resisting. In that case
the court said: "Wherever there is a carnal connection,
and no consent in fact, fraudulently obtained or otherwise,
there is evidently, in the wrongful act itself, all the force.
which the law demands as an element of the crime."
In another case,38 in sustaining a direction to a jury to
the effect that the prosecutrix need not resist to the utmost
-support

82 Va. 107, z886.
t State v. Shields, 45 Conn. 256, 1877.
64 Wis. 472, especially p. 474, i885.

See also Osgood v. The State,
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of her strength, but that the sufficiency, of her resistance was
for'theni to decide, Park, C.

J., said:. "The_ importance of

resistance is simply to show two elements in the crimecarnal knowledge by force by one of the parties and nonconsent thereto by the other. These are essential elements,
and the jury must be' fully satisfied of their existence in every
case by the resistance of the complainant if -shehad the use
of her faculties and physical powers at the time, and was
nat prevented by.terror or the exhibition of brutal force."
Wyatt, (a slave) v. The State,3 9 a, Tennessee case, de-

cided in 1852, dealt with an attempt to consummate the
act by impersonating the husband. The court spoke decidedly as to this point as follows: "The current of authority
is almost, if not entirely, unbroken on the subject. There
is no respectable conflicting authority known to us. Fraud
and stratagem then cannot be substituted for force as an
element of this offence according to the existing law."
State v. Brooks, 40 a North Carolina case, decided in 1877,
is to the same effect.
In Carnwell v. The People,41 Cooley, J., in dealing
with the "force" required to constitute the crime, held,
first, that infants were protected by statutory presumption,
and that as to other women, both sane and insane, there
must generally be proof of additional force. However, he
went on to say: "But, though the definition of the offence
implies the existence of a will in the woman, which has
opposed the carnal knowledge, no violence is done to the
law by holding, in any case where the woman, from absence
of mental action, does not willingly acquiesce, that the
physical force necessary to effectuate the purpose, however
slight, is against her will. There are cases in which it has
been held that if the woman's consent is obtained by fraud,
she at the time supposing the man to be her husband, the
crime of rape is not committed. But there are some cases
in this country to the contrary, and they seem to us to stand
upon much the better reasons and to be more in accordance
with the general rules of criminal law. And in England
where a medical practitioner had knowledge of the person
so 2 Swan (Tenn.), 394,
4
Supra, note ig.

1852.

40

76 N. Car. i, 1877.
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of a weak-minded patient, on pretence of medical .treatmerit; the offence was held to be rape. The outrage upon
the' womani and the injury to society is just as great in
these cases as if actual 'force had been employed; and 'we
have been unable to satisfy ourselves that the act can be said
to be any less against the will of the woman when her bonsent is obtained by fraud than when it is extorted by threats
or force."
In State v. Tarr,42 though as we have seen Cornwell
v. The People is approved as to another point, on the
subject of "force" "the court seems to entertain a far more
rigid view than the Michigan tribunal, saying: "That
while proof of the intercourse without more, with one of
unsound mind will not establish force, this force may be
found if there was an assault, vi6lence or injuries." The
necessity for -excessive force was also insisted upon in
Bloodworth v. The-State,43 a Tennessee case, affirming
WVyaUtv. The State. There it appeared that connection had
been fraudulently obtained with a weak-minded girl by
means of a fictitious marriage. 'In the course of the opinion
Freman, J., said, referring to the'Wyatt case: "It was settled in that case, that the language of our statute defining
rape to be 'the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman
forcibly and against her will,' necessarily included force as
an essential element' of th crime, and that to attain the
result -by, fraudulently, obtaining consent to the act would
not make out the offence."
• With regard to the "force" necessary in 'cases of sflupefaction and drunkenness, it was'held in New York in 1867,
in a case 4" so controlled by the criminal code of the state
as to-be of little general authority, that even where the
prosecutrix is senseless from drugs or liquor, there must be
additional "force" to constitute the crime, and the decision
in R. v. Camplin, while referred to; is evaded on the ground
that there the liquor was given to the woman with the
object of exciting her, and that till she became unconscious
she refused assent to the act, while in the case at bar the
Supra, note 21.
43 6 Baxter (Tenn.), 614, 1872.
People v. Quin, 5o Barb. (N. Y.) 128, 1867. See also Walter v.
People, Id. 144, especially p. 147.
2
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evidence merely went to show intoxication resulting from
a mutual drinking bout. In this case' "forcibly" is construed with unusual strictness.
On the other hand, upon a similar state of facts, an opposite decision was rendered in Corn. v. Burke,45 Judge
Gray holding that the crime of rape is committed when connection is forcibly had with an insensible woman whether
or not such insensibility results from an act of the prisoner,
and that the only force requisite under such circumstances
is "such force as was necessary to accomplish the purpose."
In Don Moran v. The People,46 decided in 1872, the Supreme Court of Michigan receded from its position in
Cornwell v. The People47 and took narrower ground. It
appeared that the prosecutrix had been placed under the
medical care of Don Moran, and that by threatening her
with an alternative operation dangerous to her life and
involving much pain and suffering, he had induced her to
submit to sexual intercourse with him for the alleged benefit
of her health. On the question of the "force" present in
this case, Christiancy, C. J., insisted that there must be a
greater degree of "force" than that necessary for the act
of copulation, and declared this so in all cases where the
woman's mind is not unbalanced. He specifically deprecated the court's previous dicta in Cornwell v. The People,
to the effect that in cases involving the personation of the
husband, fraud should be held to supply the place of force,
and in an elaborate opinion defended a strict construction
of the term "forcibly"; curiously, however, when he came
to the character of the force required, he adopted a liberality of construction totally at variance with his conservatism regarding the degree, for he held that "force" may
consist of threats and falsehoods if they are of a nature calculated to scare the prosecutrix into submission.
In Texas it has been held in two cases48 that the "force"
required by statute is additional, and hence since no special
protection is given by law to women of unsound mind over
ten years of age, such unfortunates are liable to pollution,
17 .
46 25 Mich. 355, 1872..
41Supra, note 19.
v. The State, iS Texas App. 275, x883, and Rodriguiz v.
The State, 2o Texas App. 542, 1886.
41 Supra, note
4Baldwin
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because frequently their violation cannot be construed as
"forcible."
And in his celebrated treatise on Criminal
Law49 the late Mr. Bishop says, that while "consent," even

though fraudulently obtained, negatives rape; yet "were
such consent void as consent, still where it exists there
is probably not the force which is an ingredient in rape."
Then in the same words used in Bailey v. Com.50 he
asserts that where there is no consent (fraudulent or otherwise) the act itself comprehends all the force required to
constitute the crime.
- If. we sum up the American law we shall find that in
nearly, if not all, jurisdictions the term "forcibly" is construed as including a degree of force additional to that
necessary for the consummation of the act in all cases
where the submission of a mentally competent prosecutrix
is obtained, even though fraud be employed. The only
thing opposed to this view seems to be the dicta of Judge
Cooley in the Cornwell case, which was afterwards expressly reconsidered and disapproved by the same court in
Dan Moran v. The People.5 1
With regard, however, to cases of imbecility, stupefaction and drunkenness, there seems to be a wide difference
of opinion, and while some courts hold that in such cases
that degree of "force" comprehended in the act itself is
sufficient, others insist that there must be some additional
force to constitute the crime, even in cases where the prosecutrix has not the full use of her faculties at the time the
act is committed.
The significance of the construction of the word "forcibly" is, that if it is strictly construed, i. e., as implying
additional force, then in cases of submission through fraud,
even though such submission be held as not amounting to
consent, the act not having been "forcibly" committed, cannot be "rape."
Therefore, before passing to the consideration of what
legally constitutes "consent," it is submitted that the position of the law with regard to the construction of the term
"forcibly" is archaic and narrow, illogical and inhumane.

to

"Bishop on Criminal Law," Vol.
50 Supra, note 37-

II,
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51Supra, note 46.
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Is there any sufficient reason why connection with an imbecile should be held forcible; but connection with a woman
who thinks the man her husband not forcible? In both
cases there is just the same degree of force employed, and
in both the submission arises from precisely the same cause,
ignorance of the nature of the act, for a woman deceived
into believing that the man embracing her is her husband is
as ignorant of the real nature of the transaction as an idiot,
whose clouded brain fails to comprehend the mere physical
significance of the connection.
As a first step then towards a much-needed reformation
in this branch of the law, let all jurisdictions agree that
where there is, as it is said, "no consent fraudulently obtained or otherwise," no additional force shall be required
to constitute the crime. Then let them go farther, and hold
that in all cases save those where intelligent consent is actually proved, the term "forcibly" shall be considered satisfied by proof merely of that force necessary foi coition, for
where the prosecutrix is unaware of the true nature of that
to which she submits, it is unjust in the extreme to expect
her to resist, and if she does not resist there will be no necessity for the exercise of any additional force. True it is,
that in many jurisdictions the law on this subject may be
regarded as settled, and in such jurisdictions the duty of
changing the law will devolve on the legislatures. Where
there is so, statutes should be promptly passed to remedy
this defect; for defect it is, and one which every day of
civilizing thought and progress renders more patent and
more deplorable.
3. Let us now take up that portion of our subject which
concerns the ascertainment of the legal meaning of the
word "consent." And it should be here stated that there
is no difference in meaning between "consent" and "assent,"
they being used concurrently and interchangeably by the
most learned jurists.
Webster defines "consent" as meaning "to accord in
mind," and certainly to the layman such is the only
meaning which the word conveys, it being a compound
derivative from two Latin words, for which Webster's
definition might serve as a translation. Such, then, being
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the literal significance of the word, let us see if the same.
or a different meaning attaches to it when legally construed
in connection with the definition of "rape."
In pursuing this investigation we shall find it necessary
to discuss as briefly as is consistent with the attainment of
our object (A) the distinction between "consent" and submission and (B) those classes of cases actually, including
both consent and submission, in which, whether rightfully
or wrongfully, the doctrine of "consent" has been invoked
as a defence to the charge of rape, to-wit: (i) Cases of
intelligent and express consent; (2) Cases of intelligeni
submission through fear; (3) Cases of unintelligent submission through lack of mental capacity, stupefaction, or
drunkenness (often inexactly termed "cases of unintelligent
consent"); (4)Cases of submission obtained through fraudulent representations (sometimes incorrectly known as
cases of consent obtained by fraud).
(a) As to the nature of the act.
(b) As to the consequences likely to ensue from its nonperformance.
(c) As to the identity of the person performing the act.
A. It has often been definitely held that submission,
while it negatives the idea of physical resistance, in no way
implies mental acquiescence. Thus where a prostitute,
finding herself surrounded by a crowd of rough men, and.
the door of the house, to which she had fled for refuge,
barred against her, submitted without a struggle to repeated
acts of violation, during all of which she was held against
the door, it was charged that if she merely submitted, but
did not consent, the capital charge might be sustained.5"
And in the famous decision of R. v. Case,53 which we shall
examine subsequently, Patterson, J., said in the course of
the opinion: "Mr. Horn confounds active consent and
passive non-resistance, which, I think, the learned recorder
has very accurately distinguished. Here the girl did not
resist; but still there was no consent."
In a later case it was charged that non-resistance or submission on the part of a sleeping woman could not be
12R. v. Hallett et al., 9 C. and P. 748, 1841
5" 4 Cox C. C. 220, i85o.
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pleaded as a defence, such a woman being incapable of
resisting.5 4 In"this country perhaps the leading case on
this point is Bailey v. Corn.,5 5 where it was held that
though the girl submitted without struggle or outcry to her
stepfather's embraces, still the attendant circumstances were
sufficient to free her submission from any suspicion of consent. 56
B. Turning now to those cases in which "consent"
has
been pleaded as a defence to rape, we shall examine:
i. Cases of intelligent and express consent.
Cases of express consent seldom if ever come before the
courts, because where the defendant can make such a defence
he is not generally compelled to do so.
2. Cases of intelligent submission through fear.
As under (A) the most important American case is
Bailey v. Com., of which nothing more need be said.
In Iowa v. Cross it appeared that a fifteen-year-old
girl was ravished by the prisoner, who, after locking her in
a room, had forcible connection with her. She made no
violent outcry, however, and her clothes were not torn.
The verdict at the trial was guilty of an assault with intent
to commit, etc. The verdict was sustained on appeal, the
court saying, "In this case, differing from that of Tomlinson, supra, the prosecutrix is a mere child, was in the hands
of a strong man, and may have been overcome by fear and
submitted, without consenting. This the jury may have
found, and we are by no means prepared to say they were
not justified in so doing."
It is clear, therefore, that proof of submission through
fear is fatal to the maintenance of "consent" as a defence.
3. Cases of unintelligent submission through lack of
mental capacity, stupefaction, or drunkenness.
This class of cases, more than any other, seems to have
troubled the judicial mind, because, if the law as to "consent" promulgated in cases where the submission, or as it
is termed "consent," was obtained by fraud, is consistently
applied to cases of this character, the result is simply that
.1

R. v. Mayers, 12 Cox C. C. 311, 1872.

10 See also Iowa v. Cross,
State (supra).
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5 Supra,note 37.

Iowa, 67, z861, and McQuirk v. The
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the purity of womankind is made entirely dependent on
their mental capability, the mantle of legal protection being
scornfully withdrawn from those whose brains for what
cause soever are either temporarily or permanently unbalanced. But let us see how the courts have coped with this
difficulty.
The case of R. v. Richard Fletcher57 showed by its
facts the violation of a thirteen-year-old girl of weak intellect, incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, and
unable to even "distinguish the house in which she lived
from that of any of the neighbors." A conviction was had,
which was affirmed on appeal, Lord Campbell, C. J., holding that here not only did the prosecutrix not consent to
the connection, but that because of her mental incapacity
she was incapable of consenting. His Lordship concludes:
"It would be monstrous to say that these poor females are
to be subjected to such violence without the parties inflicting it being liable to be indicted. If so, every drunken
woman returning from market and happening to fall down
on the roadside may be ravished at the will of the passersby."
8
it seemed that the
In the case of R. v. Charles Fletcher"
sixteen
years, was not
prosecutrix, a 'weak-minded girl of
absolutely devoid of perception. The evidence, though circumstantial, was held by the jury to establish the fact of
connection. The prisoner set up "consent" in defence.
Verdict guilty. The case was reserved by Keating, J., on
the question as to whether it should have been left to the
jury at all, there being no evidence against the prisoner,
except the fact of connection and the imbecile state of the
girl. On appeal it was held that it could not be said under
the evidence that the connection was either against the girl's
will or without her consent. As to the crown's contention
that an idiot is incapable of consenting, it might be said
that in this respect an idiot stands in the same position as
very young children, and since it took an act of Parliament
to establish their incapacity, it would require another act
to extend the same presumption to those of feeble mind.
The conviction was quashed.
57

Supra, note 13.

58 10 COX C. C. 248-
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Both of the foregoing cases were reviewed in 1873 in
the case of R. V'.Barratt.59 The prosecutrix was one Mary
Redman. It was proved by her relatives "that she was
fourteen and a half years old, and that ever since she, was
six weeks old she was blind and wrong in her mind; that
she was hardly capable of understanding anything that was
said to her, but that she could go up and down stairs by
herself; that if placed in a chair by anyone she would remain
there till night; that if told to lie down she would do so;
that she could not communicate to her friends what she
wanted; that she could feed herself a little, but that she
was obliged to be dressed and undressed, and that she was
unable to do any work; that the prisoner had known Mary
Redman and her family about two years, and knew that
she was not right in her mind."
In reserving the case the learned trial judge said: "I
told the jury that if the prisoner had connection with the
girl by force, and if the girl was in such an idiotic state that
she did not know what the prisoner was doing and the prisoner was aware of her being in that state, they might find
him guilty of rape; but if the girl from animal instinct
yielded to the prisoner without resistance, or if the prisoner
from the girl's state and condition had reason to think the
girl was consenting, they ought to acquit him." A verdict
of guilty was found. The question on appeal was whether
or not the jury should have been given binding instructions to acquit.
It was decided that the conviction was proper, on the
ground that the evidence showed a case of extreme imbecility, a circu'mstance implying incapacity to "consent."
Such was the case, also in R. v. Richard Fletcher0 but
not in R. v. Charles Fletcher,6 ' where, in the absence of
complete idiocy, affirmative evidence was required to negative "consent" when pleaded defensively. It was, therefore,
clear that the Fletcher cases were perfectly consistent in
theory, different results having been attained because of dissimilarity in their facts.
From these cases the law in England seems to be that
where the facts show such idiocy or imbecility that the mind
50 12 Cox C. C. 498, 1873.

60 Supra, note

13.

1 Supra, note 58.

THE LAW AS TO CONSENT.

of the prosecutrix is a blank, unresisted connection amounts
to rape; but that where the prosecutrix, though so enfeebled in intellect as to be incapable of reasoning, has yet some
power of perception and is not insensible to animal passion,
an unresisted connection cannot amount to rape, because
in the absence of proof that she was coerced by the prisoner
such non-resistance is evidential of "consent."
On the subject of "stupefaction" an important decision
is that of R. v. Mayers,62 where the evidence showed that
the prisoner either had or attempted to have connection with
his sister-in-law, the prosecutrix, while she was asleep.
"Consent" and lack 6f "force" were pleaded in defence.
Lush, J., in charging the jury instructed them that if they
believed the prisoner attempted to have, connection with
the prosecutrix while she was asleep, they should find him
guilty of an attempt; the law being that a sleeping woman
is incapable of consenting to the act.
8 is the principal authority with
The Queen v. CamPlin"
regard to connection had with a' drunken woman. It
there appeared that the prisoner had administered liquor to
a-thirteen-year-old girl for the purpose of exciting ,lier into
complying with his desires. _ Ift this he had failed, she continuing to resist his importunities so long as she remained
conscious; becoming, however, insensible from intoxication,
the prisoner took advantage of her condition and violated
her.
On appeal it was held that the offence amounted to rape,
for though the liquor was administered with another intent,
still the prosecutrix, so long as she was able, had refused
the prisoner her assent, and at the time he gave her the
liquor he was well aware that its probable result would be
to render her senseless, and when he committed the act he
knew by reason of her own recent expressions that it was
directly contrary to her conscious will. Since, therefore,
he knowingly did that which he knew to be without her
consent, in consequence of an act of his which he knew
would probably aff6rd him the opportunity to do so, he
was properly convicted of the crime.
As to stupefaction and drunkenness, then, the English
62 12

COX C3.C. 311, 1873.
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law would sedm to be that a sleeping woman is incapable of
consent, and that a woman rendered insensible by an act
of the prisoner will be presumed not to consent if her actions
prior to becoming insensible are such as to reasonably support the presumption.
Now as to the same kind of cases in the United States.
In Cornwell v. The People,6 4 already frequently referred to, Cooley, J., decided that since the, Michigan
statute said "against her will," and since that phrase differed materially from "without her consent," any connection with a weak-minded woman to amount to rape must
be entirely without concurrence of her disordered mind. If
she had sufficient "will" to cause her to stand on her head
in an effort to simulate an hourglass, it followed that she
had sufficient "will" to permit sexual intercourse, which
being in accordance with that animal desire for coition
often strongly present in the insane, could scarcely be held
against her "will," unless there was some evidence that she
resisted the act.
In State v. Tarr,65 however, a somewhat more liberal
rule was laid down, it being held that in cases of connection had with an idiotic or imbecile woman, the presumption is that the connection was "against her will" in
the absence of affirmative proof that she consented. The
court, however, approves of the Cornwell case and of the
doctrine of "animal desire," explaining this decision on
the ground that the facts here showed a blankly idiotic mind
and not an active, though perverted, mentality.
In Bloodworth v. The State6 6 this question was incidentally touched upon. It was testified that the prosecutrix "was a woman of very weak mind -and almost an
idiot." Referring to which testimony the court said: "This
is, as we have said, very unsatisfactory evidence as to the
capacity of the party; and from it we could hardly be justified in concluding that she was an idiot, wholly incapable of
consenting to the act complained of," etc.
And in McQuirk v. State6 7 it was said by Sommerville, J.: "The mere fact that a woman is weak-minded
64Supra, note rg.
65Supra note 43-

" Supra, note 21.
57Supra, note 24.
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does not disable or debar her from consenting to the act.
It has been said that a woman with a less degree of intelligence than is requisite to make a contract may consent to
carnal connection, so that the act will not be rape in the
man; but, if she is so idiotic as to be absolutely incapable
of consent, the connection with her is rape." 2 Bish. Crim.
Law, p. 1121. The principle as expressed by another high
authority is that "carnal intercourse with a woman incapable from mental disease (whether that disease be idiocy
or mania) of giving oonsent is rape." i What. Crim. Law,
p. 56o. "The evidence tends to show that the prosecutr'x
was weak-minded merely, not that she was idiotic or so
non compos as to be incapable of giving consent to the act
of carnal connection with the defendant. In view of this
fact and the principles above announced, we are of opinion
that the circuit court erred in refusing the second and third
charges requested by the defendant."
The same question arose in Texas in Baldwin v. The
State,8 where it appeared that the prosecutrix, "Big
Sis Turner," was an epileptic, whom the prisoner was
alleged to have pushed down on a plank and had intercourse with. The evidence was very loose and contradictory. The prisoner was found guilty and sentenced to
death. On appeal it was held: that in Texas mental incapacity did not relieve the state from the necessity of proving lack of consent obtained by force, threats or fraud, the
only exception as to consent being expressly limited to
children under ten years of age. In concluding the opinion
the court called the attention of the legislature to the serious
defect in the code, made apparent by this case, and suggested the passage of a remedial act.
No attention being paid to said suggestion, the same tribunal three years later, in the case of Rodriguiz v. The
State, which in other respects is merely an affirmation of
Baldwin v. The State, spoke as follows: "So profoundly
impressed was this court with the radical deficiency of our
law in this particular, that it was respectfully suggested in
the Baldwin case that the legislature should pass an act
which would supply this serious defect in the law. And
"Supra, note 48.
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again it was recommended to the nineteenth legislature that
they amend Article 520 so as to cure this defect. (Rept. of
Atty.-Gen., 1884, p. 17.) But the legislature seems to have
thought it unnecessary. At all events they have not acted
upon the suggestion or recommendation. Meanwhile one
of the most revolting and heinous crimes against humanity
can be perpetrated with impunity, because it is no crime
under our law."
Nor are these the only instances in which the judicial
conscience, revolting from that decision which the state of
the law seemed to render inevitable, has found expression
inan appeal for legislative aid to cure the wrong. Similar
appeals are contained in both Bloodworth v. The State"
and Lewis v. The State,70 and it would be indeed strange
were the fact otherwise, for what man with a heart in
his body can calmly contemplate, much less administer,
a system of law which permits the unresisted violation of a
weak-minded woman to go unpunished, on the ground that
unless she is as insensible as a lump of clay, she must resist
or else she can obtain no redress; but must, in effect, be
punished, for following like a rudderless ship a mighty
current of irresistible power.
On the point as to the degree of the offence committed
by having connection with a drunken woman, it was held
in People v. Quinn~7 that since by the New York code
'such an act had been removed from the category of rape
and made a separate offence, proof of an attempt to perpetrate such a connection would not sustain an indictment for an attempt to commit rape. In the course of the
opinion the court expressed the idea of non-consent which
obtains in New York and which was really causative of this
decision, as follows: "And so it has been held by our
courts, since the Revised Statutes, that to constitute the
crime of rape the connection must be absolutely against the
will of the female, and that there should be the utmost
reluctance and the utmost resistance by her."
Opposed to this case on this ground, as well as with
regard to the construction of the term "forcibly," is Com.
" Supra, note 43.

70

3o Ala. 54, 1857.

71Supra, note 24.
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v. Burke,72 the leading Massachusetts decision, the court
holding there that connection withan intoxicated woman
was rape, whether or not the intoxication was caused
by the. act of the prisoner, "because no woman in such
a condition was capable of consenting.
It would thus appear that while there are few cases with
regard to "drunkenness" in the United States, their decision, like those involving similar points, .depends on the
definition of consent prevailing in the particular jurisdiction
where they arise.
There is, it seems to the writer, one class of cases which
so far has not been dealt with directly by the judges, in
which though the connection is had with a nIon-resisting
insane woman, it would be most unfair to convict the prisoner of rape; that is to say, cases in which the conduct of
the prosecutrix induced a bona fde belief in the mind of the
prisoner that she had intelligently consented.
It is. submitted that much. difficulty might have been
avoided- had Cornwell v. The People"*been 'solved along
this line. It.-will be -remembered that there the prosecutrix was insane, one of the features of .her' mental derangement: being, a morbid desire for sexual intercourse;.
thiat her insanity was unknown to the prisoner,:and, that the.
evidence went to show that the connection had taken place
at her solicitation. Under.such facts it is clear that-it ' is
unreasonable to convict a man of raje. But that being admitted, the important question remains, how shall he be.
acquitted without endangering the chance of convicting
others less deserving of clemency?
.It is suggested that it might logically be said-'in such a
case, here is no rape, because in order to have a crime there
must be an intent coupled with an act. The act doubtless
is present but not the intent; the only intent is to have
carnal knowledge of a consenting woman, and such an
intent is aroused and encouraged by the very acts of the
prosecutrix. These facts really present the opposite of the
argument herein contained for the insistence upon intelligence as an element of "consent," for no man can be said to
intend rape, which is a connection against the will of the
72
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woman, when unaware of her mental deficiency he proceeds
towards the consummation of the act with her apparent
approval and active co-operation.
Would it not have been better to have treated the Cornwell case in such a way, than to have arrived at a similar
result by an illogical treatment of the meanings of "fordbly" and "consent"; a treatment, too, which, as has been
pointed out, leaves a large class of unfortunate women who,
unlike the prosecutrix, furnish no provocation for the crime,
an easy prey for the heartless and the -lustful?
The theory suggested is not without authority. As far
back as A. D. 12:21 we find the following case 74 which came
before the justices in Eyre at Worcester in that year:
"Margery, daughter of Aelfric, appeals Reginald, son of
Aunfrey of Coventry, for that in the King's peace on the
Vigil of St. Paul, he raped her; and this she offers to
deraign against him as the Court shall consider."
"And Reginald comes and defends the King's peace and
the rape and all of it, as the Court shall consider, and puts
himself upon a verdict for good and ill, and gives the King
one mark that he may have a verdict, for which mark
Walter of Coventry is pledge. The jurors say that he is not
guilty of rape, because a long time before this he had her
of her own free will and again two years afterwards in the
house of her father, and they say that no cry was raised.
And so it is considered that he go thence quit and she be in
mercy for her false appeal let her be in custody."
In "Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown"75 the same thought
may be traced in the statement that anciently it was considered that a man could not be guilty of rape with his ovin
concubine, the idea evidently being that her previous acts
were quite sufficient to negative any act of non-consent she
might subsequently employ, and that her lover would be
excusable if he put such act down to mere caprice or coquetry and refused to treat it seriously or to allow it to deter
him from accomplishing his purpose.
And in R. v. Flattery,76 Denman, J., said: "There is
one case where a woman does not consent to the act of
71Select Pleas of the Crown.
75Hawkins, P.C.
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man may notbpguilty of rape,, that

"is
'Wiere the resistaice is .so slight and her behavior such
that the man may bona fid e ,'be i e ve that' she is :consenting;
but that dbes not apply to the prent case.".
The .following Significant passage is also- quoted from
McQui.k V TheState,T' a case decided by the Supreme
Court of Alabama in 1888.. ."The consent given by the
prosecutrix may .- iave been implied as well as expressed,
and the 'defendant would be justified in -asstming the
existence of such consent if the. conduct of the prosecutix towards him at the time of the occurrence was of such a
nature as to create in his mind the honest- and reasonable
belief that she bad consented by yielding her will freely
to the commission of the act, any resistance on the woman's
part falling short of this measure would be'insufficient to
overcome the implication of consent." While the soundness of the last sentence seems open to question' it is submitted that several of the cases under this head could have
been decided with equal justice under sucl a theory as
under that employed,, with the great advantage that their
decision would not, through the straining of non-applicable
rules, have been fraught with danger to women whose cases
were only partly analogous.
3. We now pass to cases of submission obtained through
fraudulent representations, of which the first sub-division
is: (a) As to the nature of the act,
In cases of this kind the rule has always been that the
submission thus obtained did not amount to consent. In
R. v. Case,78 theleading case on the subject, it appeared
that "the defendant was a medical practitioner. Mary
Impitt, who was fourteen years old, was placed under
hisprofessional care by her parents in consequence of illness
arising from suppressed menstruation, and-on the occasion
df her going to his house, and informing him she was no
better, he observed, 'Then I must try further means with
you.' He then took hold of her and laid her down in his
surgery, lifted up her clothes, and had carnal connection
with her, she making no- resistance, believing (as she
stated) that she was submitting to medical treatment for

77S~tra, note 24.
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the ailment under which'she labored." the indictment
was for'assault, the verdict was guilty. The judge charged
that if the jury believed that the prosecutrix was ignorant
of the nature of the act, they must find the prisoner guilty,
since in that case her submission could not amount to' consent. On appeal the above instruction was held correct
and the conviction affirmed.
And in R. v. Flattery7 9 a like decision was rendered
on similar facts as recently as 1877. And in connection with this case it should'be noted that a desire was
therein judicially expressed for the reconsideration of
R.'. Barrows,s0 which will be dealt with under the last subhead of this part of our subject.
1 is the leading
In this country Pomeroy v. The -State"
authority in this class of cases. There the usual facts, appeared, namely, the violation of an innocent woman by a
"quack doctor" under the pretence of medical treatment.
The decision was the same as in the cases above mentioned; indeed, they were both specifically mentioned and
approved of, the court saying: "The case is exactly witfiin
the words of Wilde, C. J., in R. v. Case, I Den. Cr. C., at
p. 582: "She consented to one thing, he did another materially different, on which she had been prevented by his
fraud from exercising her judgment and will."
Let us now consider: (b) Misrepresentation as to the
consequence likely to ensue from non-performance of the
act.
The case under this head to which it is desired to direct
special attention is that of Don Moran v. The People.2
Here it appeared that the prosecutrix had been sent to
reside at the house of the prisoner for medical treatment. He told her that he could cure her easily by having
sexual connection with her in order to enlarge her parts- so
that her "whites," which were inverted, might come away,
and that her father had consented to his having connection
with her for such a purpose. If she did not consent to this,
he said, he would be obliged to enlarge her "parts" With
instruments, an operation which would, probably result
7 Supra, note x5 .
8194 Ind. 96, x883

01

Cox 19Z.
46.

62 Supra, note

•500

THE. LAW AS TO CONSENT.

fatally to her. Thus artfully ffrightened and skilfully
i'*loituned, the girl consented to the act. It is submitted,
though the case was. decided differently, that she'e did conisent' for here, tinlik. tfie case -'in the preceding section, she
knew the nature of that to which she subhitt&d, and no
fear of subsequtent, jll-he~lth can 'purge a woman of the
shame attached to active co-operation in her' own dishonor.
It is admitted that such cases are on the border line of those
Where submission cannot amounf' to consent hecause'obtained through fear. biut it is tought thatwfi're the d anger
threatened is of'an indirect nature and does not necessarily
ihv6lve the loss of life, that a woman shoild'not be excused
if she intelligently baiters her honor for jhe. physical betterment.
In Clark v. The State,"3 a case simila"- tery, it ppeared that the prosecutrix submitted to's ' al,'intercourse
on being promised some candy. Counsel for the. prisoner
requested
court to charge: '"That ' if the pri.soner procured the th6
consent 'of the pai-ty.ravished by promise .,
the
jury could not find him. guilty." This instruction was refused an d tfie refusal" was iustainea on appleal" on the
grfind that the wohan having intelligently ,ubmritted to
the sexual embrac% no misrepresentations or fraudulent
promises as to either What would or w6uld not happen as a
result of such submssion could .alter the fact that her submission, having been obtained with6ut fraud, as to the..act
or the person committing it, amounted in- law to consent,
and hence absolved the prisoner of the crime charged. ' It
is believed that Clark v. The State should be followed in
principle in deciding cases relevant under this sub-head
which may arise in'the future.
We now dome to our last sub-division: (c) Misrepresentation as to the identity of the person performing the. dct.
We have already examied many of the authonties1on
this subj:ect under the head of the "force" necessary to constitute the crime,' and, now:we shall see how'they deal with
the'other' horn 6f the dileina, aamely, the sufficiency'of
"consent" as a defece't under the facts which they present.
• " Texas, 44 8.-Sde also' Peop'le v. Broum, 47 Cal. 447; People v.
Bransby, 32 N.Y. 525, and Hull v. The State, 22 Wis. 553.
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The leading English case on this subject is Rex v. Jackson, decided in 1822 by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. The case is very poorly reported, no written
opinion being given; but merely a rough digest of the result
by the reporters themselves. It appeared that the prisoner
penetrated a married woman by fraudulently inducing in
her mind the belief that he was her husband. The juryfound that it was his intent to have connection with her, if
possible, by means of said fraudulent personation; but to
desist if discovered and not to force her. The following is
the digest of the opinion: "The case was considered by The
Judges in Trinity term, 1822, when four Judges thought,
that the having carnal knowledge of a woman whilst she
was under the belief of its being her husband would be a
rape, but the other eight Judges thought that it would not;
and Dallas, C. J., pointed out forcibly the difference between compelling a woman against her will, when the abhorrence which would naturally arise in her mind was called
into action, and beguiling her into consent and co-operation; but several of the eight Judges intimated, that if the
case should occur again, they would advise the jury to find
a special verdict."
How much better it would have been for the logic of
those cases in which R. v. Jackson has been followed, if this
"difference" so forcibly pointed out by the learned judge
had been spread upon the face of the report, instead of
being held in solution, as it were, and never precipitated.
It will also be noticed that one-third of the court dissented, and of the majority.several confined their decision
to the case in hand.
For some inexplicable reason, however, the majority
opinion in this case was regarded as having definitely settled the law on this point, a view of the case which would
probably have surprised none more than the learned gentlemen who decided it.
In R. v. Saunders 4 it appeared that Mr. and Mrs.
Cleary retired one evening, and that during the night Mrs.
Cleary. felt a hand pass around her and turn her over, to
which, believing it was her husband, she made no resistance,
8,Supra, note 28.
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nor did she resist the connection which immediately took
place. While the connection was going on, however, -she
perceived from the man's breathing that he-was not her
husband, and -immediately pushed him off. The poor
woman was then so overcome wicith shame and mortification that-she ran downstairs and hung herself, being cut
-down only in time to save her from death by strangulation.
'Mr. Cleary it seemed had been obliged, unknown to. his
wife, to. leave the room- some minutes before the occurrence
and was absent while it was taking place.
On this state of facts Gurney, B., instructed the jury that
the offence of rape had not been committed, "as the crime
was not committed against the will of the prosecutrix, as
she consented, believing it to be her husband" ; he instructed
them, however,' that they might find the prisoner guilty Of
an assault (which was done), concluding his charge in these
words: "Although in point of law this -is not a rape, I
consider-it one of'the'most abominable offences that can be
committed." •
In R. v. - Willidms,8 5 which is reported in the samie volume with' the Saunders case, the facts were substantially
the same, and on its being made clear that the connec tion
had ended before the prosecutrix discovered the imposition,
Alderson -B., said:- "That puts an end to- the' capital
charge.' The case of Rex v. Tackson is in point, but the
case. must proceed as to the assault."
R. v. Clarke8 6 is a very definite affirmation of R. v. Jackson. In reserving this case for the Appellate Court,
Crowder, J., stated the facts as follows: "It appeared in
evidence that Jane Murgatroyd went to bed at half-past
nine o'clock in the evening, leaving the outer door of her
house unfastened, in the expectation of her husband's return home. Having fallen asleep, she was awakened at
about half-past two o'6lock by a man whom she believed
to be her husband passing over her and getting into bed
on the opposite side from that on which she was lying.'
She then'fell -asleep again, and in about ten minutes was
awakened by' the- man in bed with her drawing fier towards
him. and having oiinection witih. her. "'She' -a~snted to the
85Supra, note
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connection in the belief that the man was her husband.
She afterwards fell asleep again and awoke in about twenty
minutes, and then first discovered that the man in bed with
her was the prisoner at the bar, who, as soon as he found
himself detected, jumped out of the bed and went away."
Verdict guilty, with the further finding that the prisoner's
intent was to have connection with the prosecutrix fraudulently, but not by force. The case was reserved because
of the dubious character of the decision in R. v. Jackson.
On appeal, however, the matter was settled in short
order, to-wit: "Jervis, C. J.: 'We cannot permit this matter'
to be opened now. We have spoken to several of the other
judges upon the subject, and they all think that the decision
in R. v. Jackson is conclusive.' Alderson, B.: 'Most of us
think it right.' Coleridge, B., Martin, J., and Crowder,
J., concurred. Conviction quashed."
S7
In 1868 the question arose in the case of R. v. Barrow,
in which case the prosecutrix, one Harriet Geldart, testified as follows: "I and my husband lodge together at
William Garner's. We sleep upstairs on the first floor and
were in bed together on the night of Saturday the twentyfirst of June. I went to bed about twelve o'clock, and about
two o'clock on Sunday morning I was lying in bed and
my husband beside me. I had my baby in my arms and was
between waking and sleeping. I was completely awakened
by a man having connection with me and pushing the baby
aside out of my arms. He was having connection with me
at the moment when I completely awoke. I thought it was
my husband, and it was while I could count five after I
completely awoke before I found it was not my husband.
A part of my dress was over my face, and I got it off, and
he was moving away. As soon as I found it was not my
husband I pulled my husband's hair to awake him. The
prisoner jumped off the bed."
Verdict guilty and the case reserved.
On appeal Bovill, C. J., said: "We have considered this
case. It does not appear that the prosecutrix was asleep
or unconscious at the time when the first act of connection
took place. What was done was, therefore, with her con87

Supra, note 8or.

THE LAW AS TO CONSENT.

sent, though that was obtained by a fraud. We are of
opinion that this case comes within that class of cases in
which it has been decided that where, under such circumstances, consent has been obtained by fraud, the offence
does not amount to rape."
Such was the state of the law in England when the Court
for Crown Cases Reserved in Ireland decided R. v. Dee s
in 1884. In that case the evidence showed that the
prosecutrix, Judith Gorman, had gone to her bedroom on
the evening of June 9, 1884, about nine o'clock, her husband just before that having left the house on a fishing
excursion. On entering her room she lay down on the bed
without undressing and fell asleep. Later she heard someone enter the room and, thinking it was her husband, said:
"You came in very soon." She received no answer. The
man then threw himself upon her and had connection with
her; but while the connection was- going on she discovered
by feeling the man's hair that he was not her husband, as
she had believed he was, and she then ran downstairs and
called a neighbor to her assistance. The verdict was guilty.
In reserving the case the judge advised the court above that
all the evidence of the prosecutrix should be treated as true.
On appeal the conviction was affirmed by an unanimous
court, and so clearly and comprehensively are the reasons
in support of'the decision expressed by May, C. J., in the
course of his very able opinion, and so adequately does he
express the views of the writer upon the subject, that it is
felt that a somewhat extended extract from his opinion
may very profitably be inserted at this point. His Honor
said: "The question arises now for our consideratiori, are
we bound to follow the decisions in England to which I
have referred? The series of cases to which I have drawn
attention appear to be an echo of the first case of Rex v.
Jackson. The others followed, no further argument being
treated as necessary. Nevertheless, if the doctrine thus
established had been adopted by the judges in England
without objection, I do not think that this court should
establish a different legal determination, unanimity on such
points being of great importance. In its inception, how48 Supra, fiote 33.
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ever, the original case of Rex v. -Jackso'an was dissented
from by four of the twelve judges who heard it, while of
the majority several apparently doubted the doctrine there
contended for. In the case of Reg. v. Flatteryall the judges
desired that this doctrine should be re-considered. In Ireland, until the present case, no similar question seems to
have arisen; and it appears to me, under all the circumstances, that it is competent for us, and it is our duty to
consider the doctrine of those English decisions upon their
merits. Now, rape being defined to be sexual connection
with a woman without her consent, or without, and therefore against, her will, it is essential to consider what is
meant and intended by consent. Does it mean an intelligent, positive concurrence of the will of the woman or is
the negative absence of dissent sufficient? In these surgical
cases it is held that the submission to an act believed to be
a surgical operation does not constitute consent to a sexual
connection, being of a wholly different character; there is
no consensus quoad hoc. In the case of personation there
is no consensus quoad hanc personam. Can it be considered that there is a consent to the sexual connection, it
being manifest that, had it not been for the deceit. or fraud,
the woman would not have submitted to the act? In the
cases of idiocy, of stupor, or of infancy, it is held that
there is no legal consent, from the want of an intelligent
and discerning will. Can a woman, in the case of personation, be regarded as consenting to the act in the exercise
of an intelligent will? Does she consent, not knowing the
real nature of the act? As observed by Mr. Curtis, she intends to consent to a lawful and marital act, to which it is her
duty to submit. But did she consent to an act of adultery?
Are not the acts themselves wholly different in their moral
nature? The act she permitted cannot properly be regarded
as the real act which took place. Therefore, the connection
was done, in my opinion, without her consent, and the crime
of rape was constituted. I, therefore, am of opinion that
the conviction should stand confirmed."
The best evidence of the way in which the foregoing case
was regarded in England is afforded by the following paragraph of the so-called "Criminal Law Amendment Act,"
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passed by Parliament in 1885, to-wit: "Whereas doubts have
been entertained whether a man who induces a married
woman to permit him to have connection with her by personating her husband is or is not guilty of rape, it is hereby
enacted and declared that everysuch offender shall be deemed
to be guilty of rape."8 9 This legislation righted a great
wrong, and though it is thought the same result might have
been accomplished by overruling Rex v. Jackson when a
similar case next arose, still in view of the known conservatism of the English Bench with regard to precedents,
it is probable that the wiser course was adopted.
In the United States there have fortunately not been
many cases of this kind, and in those which have arisen
the absence of "force" has been made the principal ground
of decision. In Lewis v. The State,90 however, it was
clearly held that connection obtained by fraudulent personation of the husband was had with the consent of the
prosecutrix, and a similar decision was reached in Bloodworth v. The State,91 where the fraud consisted in the
performance of a fictitious marriage ceremony. It is
true such decisions were disapproved in general terms in
Cornwell v. The People,92 but that disapproval was reversed as insufficiently considered dicta in Don Moran -v.
The People.93 The only bright spot in the American cases
is a brief comment, by the wayside as it were, which
fell from the lips of Howk, C. J., in Pomeroy v. The
State,9" to this effect: "The case is, therefore, not within
the authority of those cases which have decided, decisions
which I regret, that where a man by fraud induces a woman
to submit to sexual connection, it -is not rape."
It seems then from the above indications.that future cases
of this character arising in this country, if they are not
decided adversely to the prosecutrix on the ground of insufficient "force," will be so decided on the theory that her
submission to the fraud amounts to consent. If this
article accomplishes nothing else, the writer hopes that it
8948 and

49 Vict., C. 69. See also Chitty's English Statutes, Vol.
Tit., "Criminal Law," p. 195.
90 Supra,note 70.
91Supra, note 43
2 Supra, note i9.
91 Supra, note 46.
61 Supra, note 81.
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will cause those jurists who may in the future be obliged
to declare the law in this regard to examine the British
decisions with care and discrimination, to notice the instability of opinion which is manifest,,in Rex v. Jackson, the
blind way in which for years its sum total was copied, the
final triumph for clear reason and natural justice marked
by R. v. Dee, and finally, and most important of all, the
intervention of the legislature, by which all the errors of the
past were expunged from the records of the law. In few
states it is thought would a similar line of decisions make
so drastic a measure necessary, but whether by adjudica.tion or legislation: it matters little, so long as the desired
result be obtained and one more pitfall is removed from the
path of virtuous womanhood.
We now come to the second main division of our topic,
to-wit:
II.

"CONSENT" AS A DEFENCE TO AN INDICTMENT FOR AN
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT RAPE.

Assault with intent, etc., is a less offence than rape, being
supportable on evidence going to show that some degree of
force was applied by the prisoner to the body of the prosecutrix in the course of an attempt to consummate the crime
of rape.
Thus in R. v. Mayers 5 it seemed that the prisoner had
made an unsuccessful attempt to have connection with his
sister-in-law while she was asleep, and the court instructed
the jury that if they believed the foregoing to be true, they
should find the prisoner guilty of an attempt, which was
done.
In accordance with the general rule, "consent," where
proved is a good defence to a charge of assault with intent,
etc. It will be found that pretty much the same theories
obtain with regard to this offence as to the preceding one.
For instance, it has been definitely held in a number of
cases that in the absence of evidence of additional "force,"
a conviction of an attempt or an assault with intent, etc.,
cannot be obtained. We also meet with cases like People
. 91Supra, note
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v. Quinn9 where though the crime would have been
cearly constituted at common law, yet since, by reason of
statutory alterations of the definition of the capital crime,
the attempt, if successful, would not have amounted to
"rape"; therefore, the acts themselves were held insufficient
to justify a conviction of an assault with intent to commit
rape.
While perhaps not strictly germane to this head, it may
be Well to notice a class of cases in which the evidence is
considered insifficient to warrant- a conviction either for
rape or for assault with intent to commit, etc., but where
the prisoner was found guilty of a common assault. This
is not-infrequent in the early English decisions (see "force,"
etc.), but in this country it has not been of frequent occurrence; and when it has happened there have generally been
unusual facts. For instance, in Richie v. The State9" the
facts were that the prisoner entered the house of the prosecutrix (a prostitute) late at night in company with three
other men, and that they then and there, in a rude, insolent
and beastly manner, performed the sexual act upon her six
or seven times, while her little nine-year-old daughter lay
awake beside her. , It was decided that though rape was
not proved, the prisoner was rightfully found guilty of 'an
assault, because though the prosecutrix might have coisented to -the act itself, still she did not consent to the
violent and humiliating manner in which it was performed.
See also Regina v. Hallett.98
"
Closely connected in theory with the foregoing cases is a
class of decisions in which, though the defendants were
convicted of assault with intent to commit, etc., the same
idea of separability of consent prevails.
In Iowa v. Cross9 it appeared that the prisoner had
chased the-prosecutrix into a room, locked the door, thrown
her on the bed, and had connection with her. It did
not appear that she had either cried out or offered any
serious resistance. In affirming the conviction of an assault with intent, etc., the court said: "Of course if there*
was consent on the part of the prosecutrix, there could be
"Supra, note 44.
" Supra, note 52.
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no such violence in legal contemplation as to render the
prisoner guilty, for if the liberties .were taken with her consent, there could be no rape nor yet an assault with that intent. But where the assault is made by the prisoner with the
intent to commit the offence, and this is clearly shown, the
jury might convict, though not satisfied that at the time he
consummated his purpose there was such want of consent
as to constitute the higher crime." And in State v. Atherton' 0 0 it was also said (affirming and citing Iowa v. Cross) :
"There is evidence to show that the defendant in the outset
used some force, and that the prosecutrix made some resistance. Now the use of force, in an endeavor to have
carnal knowledge of a woman, tends to show an intent to
commit rape, and such intent may exist consistently with
the fact of a subsequent consent. A person then may be
indicted for rape, and if the conviction for that offence is
prevented by reason of evidence of the woman's consent,
yet if, before the consent was given, it appears that the defendant used such force as to evince an intention to commit
rape, the defendant may be convicted of an assault with an
intent to commit rape."
These cases stand for a slightly different principle than
those before mentioned, in that they only permit a conviction of assault, etc., on evidence of force used and unconsented to prior to the commission of the act of copulation,
and do not permit a conviction on proof of excessive force
employed in the performance of the act, as was the case in
Ritchie v. The State. However, the main point in both
is the same, namely, that the consent of the prosecutrix does
not necessarily cover the whole transaction, but is separable,
and hence while she may have consented to the act itself,
she may not have consented to previous or incidental violence, and hence the prisoner, though innocent of the capital
charge, may be guilty of an assault with intent to commit
rape.
Leaving the above topic, we come to the last division of
our subject, to-wit:
100So Iowa, i89.
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III.

"CONSENT" WHEN PLEADED IN DEFENCE TO AN INDICTMENT FOR ASSAULT.

There are many kinds of assault, but we are concerned
with only one of them, namely, assault by the administration of poison. Whether or not the administration of
poison can under any circumstances amount to assault
seems to be still a mooted question. In England it was
held, in 1838, in the case of R. v. Button,10 1 that such an
act was an assault; but this decision does not seem to be
sustained by the subsequent cases. 10 2 However, the same
0 3 which
point arose in Massachusetts in Com. v. Stratton,'
resulted in a clear-cut determination that the administration
of poison constitutes an assault, the court saying: "Although
force and violence are included in all definitions of assault,
or assault and battery, yet where there is physical injury
to another person it is sufficient that the cause is set in
motion by the defendant, or that the person is subjected
to its operation by means of any act or control which the
defendant exerts." It is submitted that the view of the
Massachusetts court is the better, since unless the necessity of "force" to constitute an assault be liberally construed, numerous cases in which the cause and effect are
consistent with aggravated assault must fail, because at
the moment of commission no actual violence is employed.
This question, however, will arise again in the cases.
R. v. Bennett' 4 was a case in which the prisoner was
indicted for an indecent assault upon his niece, aged thirteen. It appeared that on two occasions the parties had
slept together, that the prisoner had given his niece liquor
on each occasion just before retiring, and that though she
could not remember that her uncle had done anything to
her, a medical examination to which she was subjected a
week later had revealed the fact that she was then suffering
from a venereal disease.
In charging the jury Willes, J., after instructing them
1018 C. and P. 66o, x838.
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that there was no evidence of a rape, continued: "But
although the girl may have consented to sleep and, therefore,
to have connection with her uncle, yet if she did not consent to the aggravated circumstances, i. e., to connection
with a diseased man, and a fraud was committed on her,
the prisoner's act would be an assault by reason of such
fraud. An assault is within the rule that fraud vitiates
consent, and, therefore, if the prisoner, knowing that he
had a foul disease, induced his niece to sleep with him, intending to possess her, and infected her, she being ignorant
of his condition, any consent which she may have given
would be vitiated, and the prisoner would be guilty of an
indecent assault." The verdict was guilty and a sentence
of two years' imprisonment at hard labor was imposed.
5 where
This case was followed in 1867 in R. v. Sinclair,""
the evidence, though insufficient to establish rape, showed
that while free from disease prior to the connection, within
a week after it took place the prosecutrix was found to be
suffering severely from gonorrhea, with which the prisoner
was also afflicted.
This was also a case at nisi prius, and in his charge to
the jury Mr. Justice Shee merely went over the same
.ground which Willes, J., had traversed in R. v. Bennett
and arrived at the same result, namely, that under such
circumstances "fraud vitiates consent." R. v. Bennett was
specifically approved of.
A severe shock, however, was given to the theory of the
foregoing decisions by Hegarty v. Shine,0 5 which was determined on appeal in the Queen's Bench Division of the
High Court of justice for Ireland in 1878. The case arose
from a civil action for breach of promise and damages for
an assault arising from the infection of the plaintiff and
her unborn child, with syphilis, by the defendant, at some
time during a period of concubinage, during which the
plaintiff had at no time refused her consent to the sexual
act. The action for breach of promise was withdrawn in
the court below, and the only question on appeal was as to
the plaintiff's right to recover damages for an assault. The
court was divided. Fitzgerald and Barry, JJ., held (i)
,03 13 COX C. C. 28, 1867.

108 14 COX C. C. 124, 1878.
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that the maxim ex turpi causa non oritor actio applied to
the case, though in support of this finding they cited a
number of contract cases with the possible exception of
Fivaz v. Nicholl, whereas this action was founded in
tort. (2) With regard to R. v. Bennett, they held that
it should not be followed, because the rule that "fraud
nullifies. consent" being a doctrine of contract, could not be
imported into an action for a tort.
It must be said that the findings of the majority seem
inconsistent, though it is thought that the second point is
sound.
May, C. J. (dissenting), held that there was no need to
invoke the aid of the rule adopted in R. v. Bennett in order
to recover, for no fraud is needed to nullify a consent which
has never been given, and in a case of this kind the woman's
consent is clearly separable, extending no further than the
act of connection and not including the incidental infection
with disease, a fact of the probability of which had the
plaintiff been aware she would unquestionably have refused
her assent to the whole transaction. As to the applicability
of the other doctrine, the Chief justice said: "Nor do I
think that the maxim ex turpi causa non oritor actio is
applicable to the present case. That principle, I think,
governs cases of contract. A promise cannot be supported,
on the contrary is vitiated, by an immoral consideration,
nor can a contract be enforced if its object be to promote
and encourage immorality or illegality. But the present
case is founded on tort. The defendant has done an act
injurious to the plaintiff and has done it wilfully and intentionally. Upon the authority of the case referred to, I think
it must be held that this wrong was done to her without her
consent. It does not occur to me that the court, if it hold
the defendant liable in damages to the plaintiff in this case,
would be sustaining immorality. It seems to me, on the
other hand, that the imputation of injustice would rest
upon a decision holding that a defendant who has inflicted
a lifelong injury upon his victim by depriving her of her
bodily health should escape with impunity because he had
previously deprived her of her chastity and obtained possession of her person."
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The significance of the various theories advanced in
Hegarty v. Shine will be better appreciated after an examination of the next case, R. v. Clarence,10 7 which, since
its decision in 1888 by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved
in England, has been considered the leading authority on
this branch of the law.
The facts in this case were particularly revolting. It appeared that the prisoner, who knew that he was suffering
from gonorrhea, had marital intercourse with his wife
without informing her of the fact, with the result that he
infected her, and from such infection she suffered grievous
bodily harm.
The indictment was drawn under 24 and 25 Vict., C.
IOO, S.47, and contained two counts, one of which charged
the prisoner with "an assault" upon his wife, "occasioning
actual bodily harm," and the second count, drawn under
section 20 of the same statute, charged him with "unlawfully and maliciously inflicting" upon her "grievous
bodily harm." A conviction having been had in the court
below, the question on appeal was whether he was properly
convicted upon either count. The conviction was reversed
by a vote of nine to four, Wills, Smith, Stephen, Manisty,
Mathew and Grantham, JJ., and Pollock, B., and Huddleston, B., and Coleridge, C. J., composing the majority,
while Hawkins, Field, Day and Charles, JJ., were in the
minority. Six judges delivered opinions against the conviction and two wrote in support of it; but since space forbids an extended examination of this voluminous case, we
shall confine ourselves to the consideration of the opinions
of Wills, J., and Hawkins, J., which adequately discuss the
various theories involved in the decision.
Judge Wills first adverted to the fact that the prosecution had been brought under a statute, and then stated
that the conviction might be sustained on three theories,
to-wit: (i) That the existence of fraud nullified consent on
the part of the wife; (2) that, because of her ignorance of
her husband's physical condition, the wife's submission
without knowledge of the facts is no consent at all, and
(3)that inasmuch as under the divorce law of Great Brit107

x6 Cox C. C. 511, i888.
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ain the act done amounted to "legal cruelty," it could not
be considered as within the consent implied by the marital
relation.
He then states his objections to all three theories. As to
the first, he reiterates the assertion that it is an effort to
apply to criminal law a doctrine belonging only to contracts, and he cites as an example of what would follow its
adoption, the supposed case of a man knowingly purchasing
the consent of a prostitute with a counterfeit coin, and says
that such a man would, under such a theory, be guilty of
rape. As to the second theory, he admits that it is by far
the strongest, but he seems afraid to adopt it, because of
certain results which he thinks would necessarily flow from
it. If this view is correct, he argues it applies equally to
the married and to the unmarried, and a greater difficulty
is that a man so infecting a woman, even his own wife, is
guilty not only of assault, but rape.. On this point he says:
"To separate the act into two portions, as was suggested
in one of the Irish cases, and to say that there was consent
to so much of it as did hot consist in the administration of
an animal poison, seems to me a subtlety of an extreme
kind. There is, under the circumstances, just as much
and just as little consent to one part of the transaction as
to the rest of it. No one can doubt that in this case, had
the truth been known, there would have been no consent or
even a distant approach to it."
The rest of his opinion is taken up with a discussion of
the third theory and the applicability of the statute in
question, and since said discussion is of merely local importance, we need not enter into it. What we. may see from
his opinion is that there are two broad grounds on which
such a conviction may be supported, and the whole case
really gains its significance from the manner in which those
grounds are either affirmed or denied by the different
judges.
In his dissenting opinion Hawkins, J., freely abandoned
the first ground as untenable, saying: "In dealing with
this case my judgment is not based upon the doctrine that
fraud vitiates consent, because I do not think that doctrine
applies in the case of sexual intercourse between husband
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and wife" His affirmation of the conviction is based entirely on the theory that since the, wife- did not coisent to
the administration of the poison, the husband was guilty of
an assault. As to her consent to the act of connection, he
holds that was given once for all and irrevocably at the time
of marriage. Such consent, however, only applies to an
ordinary, natural and healthy coition, and the wife is entirely within her rights in refusing to permit any other.
With regard to Judge Wills' contention that consent must
be given to the whole transaction or to none of it, he
answers it thus: "My reply to this argument is that if a
person having a privilege of which he may avail himself
or not at his will and pleasure, cannot exercise it without
at the same time doing something not included in this privilege and which is unlawful and dangerous to another, he
must either forego his privilege or take the consequences
of his unlawful conduct." An answer which is practically
the same as Portia's famous invitation to Shylock to take
his pound of flesh without spilling a drop of Christian
blood.
As has been pointed out, the conviction in this case was
quashed; and by a majority of nine to four the court announced the astounding fact that a man could infect his
wife with a foul disease during marital intercourse and yet
walk the streets guiltless of crime.
In concluding this topic, it is submitted that the result
of the cases is unsatisfactory, and it is suggested that in
the future, decisions should be along the following line:
In cases of unmarried women, consent to the act of coition
should, for reasons of public policy, be held to imply consent to the risk of venereal infection and where such a result
follows to the infection itself. In cases of married women,
however, the general consent given at marriage should be
held to cover the act of connection with a diseased husband
but not the infection probably resulting therefrom, and
where such infection does result, the husband should be
held guilty of an assault upon the wife by the administration
of poison.
This doctrine of the separability of consent is.
perfectly
reasonable, and is directly in line theoretically with the
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cases of Iowa v. Crossl10 and State v. Atherton,10 9 which
have been dealt with under another head. Unless such a
line of reasoning-is adopted, it -is to be feared that' R. 'v.
Clarence must be followed, and even those judges who
composed the majority in that case were appalled at the
result which they felt obliged to reach, a result which liberated a moral criminal, loathsome, heartless, and mean
enough to use the result of his own faithlessness to pollute
the body of his innocent wife.
•We have now reached the end of this article, and in conclusion the writer merely desires to assert that its whole
purpose is to insist upon a construction of the word "consent," which is in accordance with common sense. Unless
"consent" necessarily implies intelligent appreciation of the
thing consented to in all its bearings, it is not consent but
merely submission, and submission is no defence, but generally an aggravation to crime.
This subjecf is in many respects a most unpleasant one,
and many of the facts herein recited would soil the page
were they not adduced'in support of a worthy cause. But
the cause is worthy, and the writer need offer no apology
for- anything said in its support. It is for the better protection of female purity that this 'article has been written,
and no -cause could be more,noble or inspiring.
' That the law should be so inadequate in this the twentieth
century after Christ to protect unfortunate women from
pollution is a disgrace to our manhood and to our reason,
and it is earnestly hoped that the courts and legislatures
will join hands in the near future and overcome those technical difficulties which in this department of the law so
seriously impede the administration of justice.
Theodore J. Grayson.
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